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 Vaccine development represents a special case where historically, public health 
priorities are central. Trends of privatization have increased the role played by 
pharmaceutical and biotech companies in developing new biomedical technologies. As 
the innovative science behind new medical technologies moves into pharmaceutical 
laboratories and biotech companies, the “logics of action” that pattern knowledge 
production shift. This project explores how different logics of action based on 
commercial investment and public good shaped the development of Gardasil, a new 
vaccine to prevent cervical cancer. The study found that both the logics of public good 
and commercial profit significantly shaped the final product. The study also found that 
variations in the definition of public good allowed for the settlement of tensions between 
good and profit. The findings have implications for the future of vaccine development, as 
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Introduction 
Innovation is often written into history as progress and vaccines are a great 
success story of modern medicine. Pediatric vaccines have spared millions from 
morbidity and death from the viruses and bacteria that cause polio, tuberculosis, 
diptheria, measles, mumps, rubella, chicken pox and others. In 2006 the Food and Drug 
Administration approved Gardasil, a vaccine designed to prevent cervical cancer, 
precancerous genital lesions, and genital warts. Cervical cancer is second only to breast 
cancer as the most prevalent cause of cancer related deaths for women worldwide.  
As a health technology, vaccines retain an almost mythic status as the most 
successful and cost-effective way to promote health and eradicate disease. Richard
Horton writes, “Today vaccines are largely an untouchable subject, their benefits too 
obvious to be questioned. Any hint of dissent concerning their clinical effectiveness and 
all-around social value is met with bitter rebuttal and resentment” (Horton 2003: 207). 
Yet, stories of medical success efface the socio-cultural and political-economic work that 
goes into vaccine development. 
Behind the oft-told stories of disease reduction and eradication through 
vaccination are the structural realities in and through which these innovations are 
produced and used. The intersection of new potentialities made possible by advances in 
molecular and genetic science, with neoliberal shifts in the political economic 
organization of the fields of health and medicine have pushed vaccine innovation from 
state-funded apparatuses into the private sector (see Blume and Geesink 2000).  This 
privatization of vaccine research and development (R & D) has also taken place in 
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vaccine development, stimulating fundamental changes in the networks in and through 
which vaccines are produced.  
Unlike most of the vaccines of the past, Gardasil was developed by a 
pharmaceutical company rather than by state health agencies. Historically, it h s been 
state apparatuses whose obligation to public health supported development of the 
vaccines that have saved so many lives. As the science of vaccines moves into the priva e 
sector, commercial commitments to profit create a tension with the goals of public health. 
The term vaccinology captures this shift to private sector innovation and points to 
specific issues concerning this shift. Blume and Geesink explain, “Vaccinology is a 
science of and for the pharmaceutical industry. Our response to its emergence, then, will 
reflect our sense of the compatibility of industrial commitments with the earlier public 
health objectives of vaccines research. It is here that reasons for concern arise” (2000: 70; 
emphasis added).  
Research Questions 
The central research question in this analysis takes up this concern with the 
compatibility of industrial commitments with public health goals. This inquiry into
biomedical innovation asks how different logics of action (i.e. commercial profit versus 
public health good) are embedded in the process of biomedical innovation. As this 
analysis demonstrates, a clean separation between a logic of public or social go d 
underlying medical innovation on the one hand, versus a drive for commercial profit on 
the other does not accurately characterize the relationship between the two logics.  In the 
development of Gardasil, complex and continuing negotiations between public good and 
private profit are embedded throughout the process of innovation.  
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In showing how these logics are embedded in innovation, differing notions of 
public good that are mobilized in the development of Gardasil become a pivotal factor. It 
is not too long ago in historical memory that public health included not only public good 
but also the eugenic extermination of races, populations, and groups as well as human 
experimentations on “vulnerable” populations. As a sub-question this paper analyzes how 
the “public” of ‘public health’ is defined by the actors and institutions committed to and 
implicated by the development of Gardasil. The definition of such publics (whose health 
concerns feed into the logic of a general notion of public good) plays a key role in 
settling and unsettling the tension between commercial profit and public health. In the 
development of Gardasil, the complex category of woman and its intersections with class, 
race, and sexuality is bound up in what Nikolas Rose terms the “ethopolitics” of 
biomedical innovation (Rose 2006).  
The concept of ethopolitics facilitates an analysis of the mechanisms of power
that operate in and through moral justifications.  Decision-making around the issue of 
public good versus commercial profit in the context of neo-liberal shifts towards 
privatization is a question of ethics. In the development of new vaccines, a clearnarrative 
of public good as the sole motivation or justification for action can no longer be 
supported by assumptions concerning the role of the state in public health. The 
institutional logic of private sector R & D seeks to maximize profits but is also 
constrained by an ethical imperative to justify their actions (at least in part) through a 
logic of public health. The moral and ethical arguments and justifications deployed in the 
development of Gardasil are a central mechanism of power that both constrained and 
enabled the transfer of knowledge and resources that made Gardasil possible. The final 
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question in this project centers on this question of ethics and asks how an ethopolitics is 
written into the innovation of Gardasil.   
 The organization of this thesis is as follows: I begin by outlining the broad 
theoretical framework through which I investigate the development of Gardasil and 
clarify what constitutes biomedical innovation within the perspective of science a d 
technology studies. Then I move on to specify the analytic framework that I employ in 
the analysis of the innovation of Gardasil. The next section presents the methodology 
used in this study. Finally, I move on to the findings and analysis. 
Theoretical Framework 
To understand the development of Gardasil I approach the innovation through the 
broader theoretical framework of Science and Technology Studies (STS). A sub-
discipline, drawing together scholars from the humanities and social sciences, STS 
emerged (in part) from a more traditional sociology of knowledge. More specifically, this 
project works within critical STS, a branch that focuses explicitly on questions of power, 
analyzing science and technology from a perspective of social justice and dmocracy 
(Hess 1997:133). Research in the critical STS tradition opens the ‘black boxes’ of 
scientific knowledge to reveal the political content of a science once thought to be 
objective and unbiased. The science behind Gardasil was not an autonomous knowledge 
project, immune from the political, economic, social and cultural influences of the 
environment from which it emerged. 
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Technoscientific innovation in critical science and technology studies1  
Sociological perspectives in STS that focus on technology in society have shown 
that technologies have to be built. That is, they are socially constructed. This perspective, 
commonly referred to as SCOT (social construction of technology), has its roots in the 
works of Bijker, Hughes and Pinch (1987). For this project, the SCOT perspective draws 
attention to the contingent nature of technological innovation. In contrast to narratives of 
evolutionary science, the development path of new medical technologies such as 
Gardasil, is not predetermined and as I will show in this analysis, possible alternativ  
paths are ‘lost’ along the way as a matter of contingency.  
An alternative STS perspective views technologies as outcomes of particular 
socio-technical networks, intended to capture the heterogeneous social, economic, 
technical and political processes involved (Oudshoorn 2003; 1994). This perspective has 
its roots in the works of Callon, Latour and Law and is commonly referred to as actor-
network theory (or ANT) (Brown and Webster 2004).  Traditionally, these networks 
included only human actors but the importance of non-human actors (or actants) such as 
available technologies and material resources has been found to play a significant role in 
shaping the direction and interactions of scientific innovation. Vaccines, like other 
medical innovations, are outcomes of particular socio-technical networks, which are 
comprised by a mosaic of institutions, actors (both human and non-human), materials, 
relationships and resources. Building the sociotechnical network for Gardasil me nt the 
                                                
1 Technoscience, a concept introduced by Bruno Latour, emphasizes the collapse of the traditional 
distinction between science and its application –technology (Latour 1987). Tradition lly this 
distinction supported the idea that ‘basic science’ was free of the politics that were inherent in the 
application of scientific discoveries. Following Latour and others, I adopt this term to emphasize the 
political nature of scientific discoveries and practices. 
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transfer of valuable knowledge to the institutions that controlled the necessary mate ial 
resources that made the vaccine a possible outcome. 
The sociotechnical networks that produce biomedical innovations only comprise 
part of the story. Alternative analytic approaches to technological innovation have 
brought cultural aspects forward along with sociotechnical networks (see especially 
Oudshoorn 2003). In The Male Pill, for example, Nelly Oudshoorn demonstrates the 
importance of the cultural context of biomedical innovation as both a constraining and 
enabling force. In her study, the innovation in  male contraceptive technology has been 
stalled not only by a lack of industrial interest (and therefore a lack of available resources 
and networks of innovation), but also more significantly by norms of hegemonic 
masculinity that have prevented the configuration of an appropriate user (Oudshoorn 
2003). Oudshoorn also shows how the importance of cultural context extends even into 
the science itself, demonstrating how cultural norms and beliefs about masculinity and 
reproduction shaped how scientists could design male contraceptives.  
Drawing from both the SCOT and network approaches to STS, the New Political 
Sociology of Science (NPSS) draws attention to structural bases of power and inequality 
in knowledge politics and brings a critical perspective to traditional science and 
technology studies scholarship. This focus on structural bases of power extends SCOT 
and ANT, taking the perspective that an actor’s position within a specific institution or 
network provides access to available resources, “NPSS demonstrates the ways in hich 
institutions and networks shape the power to produce knowledge and the dynamics of 
resistance and accommodation that follow” (Frickel and Moore 2006: 5). Any analysis of 
large-scale structural relationships is subject to critiques of the deterministic nature of 
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such analysis. Following Frickel and Moore, I take the position that there are “sustained 
large-scale relationships that make some kinds of claims, outcomes and processes far 
more likely than others” (Frickel and Moore 2006: 9).  
Biomedicalization and the potential of biovalue 
While a technoscientific outcome of a particular sociotechnical network, 
contingent upon the cultural and structural context of its development, Gardasil is also a 
biomedical innovation. Clarke et al. (2003) argue that the political economic 
reconstitution of biomedicine along with its increasingly technological and scientific 
make-up represents a significant shift, “a second transformation of American medicine” 
(Clarke et al. 2003: 161). By 1985 this uneven but significant shift had coalesced into 
what the authors term biomedicalization. Though largely driven by technoscientifi 
changes within health and medicine, theories of biomedicalization draw attention to “the 
realms and dynamics of the social inside scientific, technological, and biomedical 
domains [that] are too often rendered invisible” (Clarke et al. 2003: 166; original 
emphasis). Biomedicalization characterizes the sociocultural and political economic 
context of the wider arenas of health and medicine that circumscribed the innovation of 
Gardasil.  
New transformative possibilities provided by advances in molecular and genetic 
biology are one of the major tenets of biomedicalization theory. These new capabilities 
have made possible what Catherine Waldby has termed biovalue. The author explains 
that “Biovalue is generated wherever the generative and transformative productivity of 
living entities can be instrumentalized along lines which make them useful for human 
projects –science, industry, medicine, agriculture or other arenas of technical culture” 
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(Waldby 2000: 33). In other words, biovalue is surplus value extracted from the vital 
capacities of living beings both human and non-human.  
Biovalue, by definition, implies a potential for use but not a specific end. As with 
the development of Gardasil, the production of biovalue did not determine its specific 
use. The deployment of biovalue, in the case of Gardasil, was (in part) determined by th  
logic of pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies which is focused on the production 
and profitable deployment of biovalue (Waldby 2000: 19).2  Gardasil’s development in 
these specific institutional settings was contingent on the sociotechnical network from 
which it emerged and the historical trajectory of vaccine R & D. In the next section, I 
return to the concept of vaccinology that describes the networks of vaccine R & D. 
Vaccinology: An industrial science  
The history of vaccine use and success makes a ready connection between vaccine 
research and public health. The “basic science” behind new medicines has traditionally 
been credited to university academics working on grants supplied by state health 
organizations. This organization of structures and resources supported the idea of an 
autonomous realm of objective science, purportedly free from the demands of industry. 
State funding allowed researchers the freedom to pursue technological and economic 
innovation for the advancement of society and the good of the public (Kleinman and 
Vallas 2006:39). This organization of vaccine research has changed. In the case of 
Gardasil, neoliberal political economic changes designed to support innovation, (along 
with technological necessities) have pushed vaccine research into the private sector. 
                                                
2 “‘Biotechnology’ is any technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or 
derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific use” (UN Convention on 
Biological Diversity). A biotechnology (biotech) company specializes in the innovation of these types of 
technologies.   
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Privatization in vaccine development is supported by larger political economic 
changes associated with neoliberalism. Lisa Duggan writes, “The primary str tegy of 
turn-of-the-millennium neoliberalism is privatization, the term that describes the transfer 
of wealth and decision-making from public, more-or-less accountable decision-maki g 
bodies to individual or corporate, unaccountable hands” (Duggan 2003: 12; original 
emphasis). The retreat of the state from direct responsibility for the populati n and 
increasing commercialization is characteristic of neoliberal trends. Critics of neoliberal 
privatization in health and medicine cite the increasing costs of medicines and health 
services that exacerbate existing health inequalities, the lack of efficiency in the United 
States (low health outcomes per dollar spent compared to other post-industrial nations), 
and the proliferation of expensive ‘lifestyle’ drugs (Fort et al. 2004).3  
Also driving this privatization are technoscientific changes in biomedicine 
associated with biomedicalization (Clarke et al 2003).  To work at the level of genes and 
molecules, scientists need expensive equipment, large quantities of biomaterials (that are 
often of limited availability), and extensive funding. These basic research necessities 
have spurred adjustments in sociotechnical networks as researchers and other interested 
parties (i.e. pharmaceutical and biotech companies) create new sets of relations to meet 
these needs. Vaccinology describes these new networks of scientists and organizations 
involved in the production of vaccines and profitable biovalue. 
Identifying this shift to privatization, Blume and Geesink (2000) compare the 
innovation and application trajectories of the polio and hepatitis-B vaccines. While the 
polio vaccine was developed in an academic setting with state funding in response to a 
                                                
3 Lifestyle drugs are a class of pharmaceuticals that are designed to enhance the lif style of individuals 
rather than cure sickness. See Mamo and Foskett (forthcoming) and Mamo and Fishman (2002). 
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global public health crisis, the hepatitis-B vaccine was developed through collaborative 
agreements between biotech companies, pharmaceutical companies and academic 
researchers. Pharmaceutical companies funded the research and development behind the 
hepatitis-B vaccine. This privatization, the authors argue, has shifted the focus of 
innovation in vaccine research from a focus on public health priorities to a focus on 
potential profits from valuable intellectual property. “The focus, in other words, wa  not 
to be on the fight against a specific disease, but on knowledge potentially relevant to the 
development of a range of vaccines” (Blume and Geesink 2000: 59).  
As the innovative science behind new medical technologies moves into 
pharmaceutical laboratories and biotechnology companies, the logics of action tha  
pattern the production of knowledge in these settings shift (Frickel and Moore 2006; 
Knorr-Cetina 1999; Rabinow 1996; Kleinman and Vallas 2006). David Kleinman and 
Steven Vallas note,  
Amid rising fiscal constraints on public spending (and with social entitlements 
placing limits on public support for higher education), university administrators 
increasingly looked to market-based sources for much needed resources. The 
result, many suggested, involved a historically significant shift in the very logic 
that traditionally informed university research. [M]uch of this literature voiced 
concern over the ways in which joint ventures of various types between 
universities and corporations, or academic efforts to foster licensing arrangements 
or patent protection, threatened both the free flow of knowledge and the autonomy 
of scientific research (2006: 39). 
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The logics at stake in this formation are based in institutions; they are bound up with 
culture and serve to inspire and justify action (see Knorr-Cetina 1999 on epistemic 
cultures in scientific knowledge production). Through profit motives have gained ground 
due to privatization, complex and continuing negotiations between public good and 
private profit are embedded throughout the process of innovation. 
The ethopolitics of biomedical innovation 
Joan Fujimura (1987) argues that cancer research depends on the ‘doability’ of 
certain research problems. Doability not only depends on available technology, resources 
and networks, but also on the alignment of several levels of work organization. The three 
levels in which Fujimura describes this process of alignment are the level of  (1)
experiment, (2) laboratory, and (3) social world. Framing a problem in a way that can 
align these levels of organization makes a problem ‘doable’ (Fujimura 1987: 258).  
Extending this concept, I argue that a doable problem for vaccine development must also 
be ethically doable, as concerns public opinion.  
Public opinion becomes crucial factor in the success or failure of biomedical 
technologies and pharmaceutical and biotech companies are constrained in their actions. 
Sarah Franklin, for example, describes how scientific objectives are directe  by the 
necessity of avoiding ethical objection from public opinion (Franklin 2003: 98). 
‘Promissory components’ of biocapital must take into account public opinion and ethics 
before a technology makes it to market.  
Like all venture-capital-funded biotechnology companies, [one such company] is 
striving to avoid circumstances that might compromise its future profitability. By 
selecting a route forward that rids the company of one of the most potentially 
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compromising sources of public opposition in the United States… [this company] is 
charting a strategic course between what is practical and viable experimentally and what 
is commercially feasible as a means of shortcutting public opposition to research 
(Franklin 2003: 120). 
 
This ethical component of biomedicine extends into the laboratory and into the 
science at the same time that biomedicine seeks to produce surplus out of vitality. A main 
goal of this project is to identify the spaces and practices where varying not ons f public 
good and the search for commercial profit infuse each other and become an ethopolitics 
designed to work on the morality of consumers, working towards answering the question 
of why science works better for some rather than others. 
 
Methodology 
This project employs situational analysis to understand the innovation of the HPV 
vaccine Gardasil. Situational analysis, a method pioneered by Adele Clarke, is based on a 
framework of following three complementary cartographic approaches: (1) a situational 
map, (2) a social worlds/arenas map and (3) a positional map. In addition to these 
mappings, I created an innovation timeline to model process. Together these mappings 
provided the data necessary to answer the three research questions posed (see figure  1-
5).  
The first step was to build a situational map. The goal of a situational map is to 
“descriptively lay out as best one can all the most important human and nonhuman 
elements in the situation of concern of the research broadly conceived” (Clarke 2005: 
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86). This first approach to the data focused on analyzing the relations between the 
elements identified in the situation. Situational maps are messy representations of the 
situation and provide a preliminary picture of the important elements in the situation. 
The second map, a social worlds/arenas approach, focused on the collective and 
sociological aspects of groups implicated in the development of Gardasil. Social w rlds 
are defined as “universes of discourse” and “the focus of social worlds/arenas maps is on 
collective social action” (Clarke 2005: 109; 114). Individual actors were mapped into 
social worlds as representative of an arena. The boundaries between social worlds/arenas 
are porous and plastic rather than rigid and allowed a complex analysis of communities of 
commitment to action. To demonstrate the porosity of social worlds, the social worlds 
maps show overlapping categories bounded by lines that are not solid (see figure 1).  
The timeline models the sequence of innovation and highlights important events. 
The three levels within the timeline show how the development of Gardasil progressed 
along the three analytic dimensions. Innovation is not a linear process, and so the timelin
demonstrates the overlapping of the processes that eventually produced Gardasil (see 
figure 2). 
The positional maps “lay out most of the major positions taken in the data on 
major discursive issues therein –topics of focus, concern, and often but not always 
contestation” (Clarke 2005: 126). The positions of interest in this paper are whether 
developments in the production of Gardasil follow a logic of public good or commercial 
profit. For each of the three moments in the narrative a positional map shows which 
events follow which logic as well as the relationship between the opposing logics of 
action (see figures 3-5). 
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 To answer research question one, investigating how different logics of action re 
embedded in the development of Gardasil, I used the maps to identify groups committed 
to action based on the production of biovalue and/or groups operating with a logic based 
on maximizing public health good. Significantly, I found that at certain moments, these 
two logics were indistinguishable from one another (see figure 4). The critical question of 
how public health good is defined and by whom relied on the positional map to flesh out 
what public health or public good means coming from specific actors in certain social 
worlds. Question three involved a holistic analysis of all the maps, focusing on how 
commitments to action in the social worlds/arenas map articulated with the positions of 
those groups in the positional map and how these formations were able to control actions 
and resources.  
The broader puzzle of this project is how biomedical innovation happens in the 
context of advanced technoscience and a neoliberal political economic environment. To 
capture process I construct an analytic narrative, specifying the mechanisms through 
which the vaccine was developed. To construct the narrative I began at the end, with the 
release of Gardasil. By tracing the process backwards through the scientific journal 
articles, I put together the pieces of the scientific story of innovation. The theoretical 
framework that grounds this analysis pushes the boundaries of scientific innovation 
towards the inclusion of the elements at work outside of the laboratory. To capture the 
political and economic elements of the situation data collection moved to the institutional 
aspects of innovation, relevant science policy, and FDA hearings, for example.  
The story told here is only one of many narratives that could be told of the 
innovation of Gardasil. The focus on scientific innovation in this narrative reveals my 
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objective. The objective is to interrogate our notions of how science happens, opening the 
‘black box’ of innovation. The relationship of the theory to the data is interpretative and 
validity relies on the internal consistency of the narrative and the power of the 
explanation offered. In this project I hope to offer a strong explanation of biomedical 
innovation in our contemporary social formation.  
 This project draws on a variety of data types and sources. The first major sources 
of data were scientific journal articles. From these scientific journal articles, I identified 
important scientist actors, crucial technological developments, and points of scientific 
emphasis, controversy or consensus. Medical journal commentary, and published stories, 
interviews, and biographies documenting the development trajectory of the HPV vaccine 
provided supporting evidence for social worlds, positional and situational maps. 
Narratives of the development of the HPV vaccine that have been published by various 
actors and institutions provided particularly crucial supporting evidence that allowed the 
research to extend beyond the laboratory. For example, the story of a decade long patent 
battle over technology relating to the discovery of the vaccine is a significant part of the 
process that is not found in the scientific literature. 
 Publicly traded companies such as Merck & Co Inc., have financial records that 
are available for analysis. The periodic reports that are published to inform sha eholders 
of projects that are in various stages of Merck’s research and development “pipeline” 
provided evidence to the development trajectory of Gardasil. Third party licensing 
agreements and settlements were documented in these reports (although not disclosed). 
Institutional histories, news releases, business news concerning these companies, rules 
and regulations from within or outside of organizations and corporate mission statements 
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provided supporting evidence for the analysis. Specific government documents such as 
transcripts from open FDA hearings concerning Gardasil were a rich source f data. The 
Biological License Application submitted by Merck to the FDA provided evidence for 
processes of innovation.  Legal opinions and rulings relating to relevant patent disputes 
were analyzed as well. 
 This exploration of the innovation of the HPV vaccine can be seen as a response 
to Nikolas Rose’s call for a “cartography of the present”. A cartography of the present is 
a mapping of the range of paths not yet taken that may lead to potential futures. Towards 
identifying the grounds on which alternatives can be established, the mappings 
undertaken in this project also paid close attention to the spaces between and the 
discursive silences that represented the erasures and possibilities not explored. 
  
Why Gardasil? 
 The human papillomavirus is the first and only ecessary cause of any cancer that 
has been identified to date. HPV has been proven to be a necessary (but not sufficient) 
cause of cervical cancer. The ability to prevent infection of the human papillomavirus 
translates into the ability of medical science to eliminate its worst enemy. The enormity 
of the scientific breakthrough represented by Gardasil’s release makes this par icular 
vaccine a fascinating case study with implications for the future of one of themost deadly 
human diseases.  
 Unlike other vaccines, which are based on attenuated or inactivated forms of real 
viruses, Gardasil is comprised of what is most simply described as a clone of the real 
human papillomavirus. In contrast to other types of vaccines that introduce weak or 
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inactive forms of a virus or toxin, vaccines based on virus-like-particle (VLP) technology 
introduce a genetically engineered ‘copy’ of a real virus that is, in effect, good enough to 
elicit an immune response, yet artificial enough not to cause disease.  The HPV vaccine is 
only the second vaccine to be based on recombinant DNA technology (cloning), but there 
are new vaccines are ‘in the pipeline’ based on this virus-like-particle technology. 
 The timing of the development of the HPV vaccine is also important. This time 
frame encapsulates both the shift to biomedicalization and the beginnings of the 
neoliberal backlash against the welfare state (see Clarke et al. 2003 and Duggan 2003). 
Vaccine research has seen a revival due to these changes and thus, the timing of Gardasil 
provides a lens through which to reveal how larger changes in the political and economic 
arena affect medical technologies.  
Changes in vaccine development have implications for our present understanding 
of larger shifts in the political-economic arrangements of late capitalism s well as the 
future of public health in this context. Vaccines have long been in our arsenal of medical 
technologies and will continue to proliferate. Yet given shifts to privatization and away 
from public social goods, it is not only important but crucial, to understand the 
production of medical knowledges and innovation not as “discovery” but as socio-
cultural and technical networks constitutive of larger political economic organization of 
US economies. Gardasil provides a lens through which to begin to understand these 
issues.  
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Findings and Analysis 
 The following presentation of findings and analysis tells the story of the 
innovation of Gardasil. I begin with how the HPV vaccine became a doable problem. 
Building scientific consensus around the idea of the link between HPV and cervical 
cancer was crucial to the technologies being taken up by pharmaceutical and biotech
companies. The second section demonstrates how scientists were able to produce 
biovalue and shows how that production of biovalue became tied to a logic of 
commercial profit through the patenting and transfer of valuable scientific disclosures. In 
the third and last section, I detail the approval process of Gardasil demonstrating how 
ethical considerations play out in the final stage of development. At times I will tack back 
and forth from narrative to analysis, answering the research questions posed at the 
beginning of this analysis. Following this narrative, I synthesize the analysis in the 
discussion section and return to the research questions to summarize the key findings of 
this study. 
A Doable Problem: Preventing Cervical Cancer 
The human papillomavirus and its connection to cervical cancer is the only known 
necessary cause of any type of cancer. It took close to twenty years for a scientifi  
consensus to be built around this idea, but in 1995 HPV type 16 was declared a human 
carcinogen by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC; also see Bocsch 
et. al. 2002).  
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Ambivalent technology 
Harald zur Hausen spent most of his career in universities between the United 
States and Germany as a microbiologist researching the infectious cause  of cancer. Since 
the early 60’s zur Hausen had been studying viral causes of cancer. At this time, cancer 
was mainly thought to be too multi-factorial for any necessary condition to be found. 
Harald zur Hausen hypothesized the link between human papillomavirus and cervical 
cancer in the early 1970s. The link between HPV and cervical cancer needed the advent 
of two important technologies before it could be confirmed. In 1973 Cohen and Boyer, 
building on years of genetic research found a way to recombine DNA. This is often 
attributed as the birth of what is now termed ‘biotechnology’. For most readers, cloning is 
its most familiar name. Human papillomavirus cannot be grown in cell cultures like most 
viruses, therefore to do research, scientists were forced to look to other sources for HPV 
DNA. With the discovery of recombinant DNA technology, Mathis Durst, working in 
Germany, was able to clone the HPV virus type 16 and subsequently confirm its presence 
in almost 100 percent of cervical cancer tissue samples (Durst et al. 1993). Even this was 
not enough for a scientific consensus.  
Kary Mullis developed polymerase chain reaction, a technique for quickly 
identifying and replicating portions of DNA chains, in 1983. This development was said 
to have ‘democratized’ genetic research, “making genetic testing available to almost all 
researchers with minimum tools” (see Rabinow 1996). This democratization proved to 
have deleterious effects on zur Hausen and Durst’s work. The availability of PCR 
techniques (this was more of a conceptual discovery than a technical one) confused the 
etiological role of HPV in cervical cancer. “This period caused more confusion than 
   
   
 20
clarification because the tools were not used properly and people found HPV 
everywhere” (McIntyre 2005). The epidemiological evidence supported the theory tat 
cervical cancer spread much like a sexually transmitted disease and at this time Herpes 
simplex virus was thought to be the cause of cervical cancer (ibid).  
Despite being disbelieved by colleagues, zur Hausen was convinced of the role of 
HPV in cervical cancer (see zur Hausen 1976; zur Hausen 1978; zur Hausen 1989). He 
approached pharmaceutical companies in 1984 to see if they would work with his 
discovery to find a vaccine for cervical cancer (McIntyre 2005). He was unable to enroll 
the pharmaceutical industry. The incidence of cervical cancer had been decreasing for 
some time due to increased use of Pap smear screenings. Scientific consensus arou d the 
idea was not yet strong, and vaccine research was not a popular area of investme t at his 
time either. Without pharmaceutical buy-in, a cure for cervical cancer is not a doable 
problem.  Human subjects protections and increased FDA regulations have made 
pharmaceutical development safer, but the trade off is increased dependence on 
pharmaceutical companies to buy-in to a new idea or technology (i.e., see a potential for 
profit). Before federal regulations were put in place, academic researchers could take 
their own concepts all the way through what is now referred to as Phase II clinical trials.  
 Technological advances in biomedicine were ambivalent yet necessary for the
development of Gardasil. A clear logic of public good that would support the idea of a 
linear progression from crucial scientific advances to a life-saving vaccine was not the 
only logic at work in making an HPV vaccine a doable problem. The technological 
advances that eventually contributed to making Gardasil doable were not hailed as the 
all-important breakthroughs in an ongoing process that was continually frustrated by lack 
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of scientific capacity. Rather than a problem of the progression of science, the doability 
of Gardasil was simultaneously a political, cultural and scientific project. 
Institutional Scientific Consensus and Vaccine Priorities 
The International Papillomavirus Society (IPV) provided the infrastructure for the 
extension of HPV cancer research outside of the discipline of microbiology. On the 
website the mission of the organization states, “The International Papillomavirus Society 
is a not-for-profit organization of biomedical scientists who are investigating human and 
animal papillomaviruses and their associated diseases. [T]he purposes of the IPVS are 
primarily educational” (International Human Papillomavirus Society 2007). The IPV has 
held annual conferences since 1982 in different venues, connecting scientists and ideas 
from all over the world. In 1983 zur Hausen (with others) hosted the second annual IPV 
conference in Sweden. 
Scientific consensus around this link was official only two years prior to the 
submission of the first Investigational New Drug Application to the FDA from Merck. In 
1995, the International Agency for Research on Cancer officially categorized human 
papillomavirus types 16 and 18 as Group One, known human carcinogens. Part of the 
World Health Organization, The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) is 
based in Lyon, France and is dedicated to conducting research on the causes of human 
cancer and to developing scientific strategies for cancer control (IARC 2006). The 
domestic version of this list is called the “Report on Carcinogens” and is compiled by the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services National Toxicology Program. Human 
papillomaviruses were not added to this list until 2004.   
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Although certain HPV types became “known human carcinogens”, a vaccine for 
human papillomaviruses was not on the high priority list for needed vaccines when 
development began. 4 At the request of the NAID and the NIH, the Institute of Medicine 
(a non-profit organization chartered in 1970 as a component of the National Academy of 
Sciences) issued two lists of vaccine priorities; one for United States priorities and 
another for health priorities in developing countries. The human papillomavirus did not 
make the 1985 list of priority diseases for domestic vaccine development but did make 
second tier on a 1999 update of the 1985 list. The IOM also created the model through 
which vaccine priorities were decided. The addition of a target disease as  candidate for 
vaccine development rested on the current “state of knowledge” concerning the 
development of a particular vaccine. Regardless of the lack of need for this vacc ne target 
established in 1985, by 1999, microbiologists were well on their way to developing a 
working HPV vaccine. The model for adding a vaccine to the IOM list also utilizes a 
reductive cost-benefit analysis.  The ‘benefits’ of a potential vaccine must outweigh the 
‘costs’. The addition of HPV in 1999 as a “more favorable” vaccine candidate (versus 
“most favorable”) is calculated based on how much money an HPV vaccine could save 
society (Chapter 2: Priority setting for health-related investments: a review of methods; 
see also Galambos 1995: 148). 
To make an HPV vaccine a doable problem, zur Hausen had to build consensus 
around the connection between HPV and cancer to establish potential public good. The 
scientific “bandwagon” at this time was focused on herpes as a cause of cervical cancer 
                                                
4 See Committee on Issues and Practices for New Vaccine Development. 1985.  New 
Vaccine Development: Establishing Priorities, vol. 1, Diseases of Importance in the 
United States; vol. 2, Diseases of Importance in Developing Countries. In titute of 
Medicine: Washington D. C.   
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and not HPV (see Fujimura’s 1988 work on scientific bandwagons). Technological 
advances alone were not enough to provide consensus. Consensus emerged when the 
technological advances were stabilized enough to produce consistent results and when the 
political economic environment was suitable for investment in this particular vaccine. 
The stabilization of experimental techniques is a requirement for a new scientific 
bandwagon to take hold but it would take more than science to get pharmaceutical buy-
in, a necessity for biomedical innovation (Fujimura 1988). The professional organizations 
that held conferences played a significant role in transferring scientifically legitimated 
knowledge outside the discipline of virology and to pharmaceutical companies. The need 
for pharmaceutical buy-in for medicines and vaccines to be made available to the public 
has not always been the case. We have already explored the technoscientific doability of 
the HPV vaccine. Next, we turn to the historical development of the political economic 
situation to complete the explanation of how the HPV vaccine became a doable problem. 
Favorable Political Environment 
Although, vaccines had recently achieved unrivaled medical success with the 
eradication of small pox in 1979, pharmaceutical investment in vaccine research and 
development had been on the decline. Many of the private firms that participated in 
vaccine innovation and production began leaving the business in 1968 and over half had 
left by 1979 (Galambos 1997:178).  Companies involved in private sector vaccine 
development had every reason to abandon this domain of health research. Lawsuits 
claiming injury from vaccines were on the rise, R & D costs had been steadily increasing, 
and government contracts demanded low cost vaccines that undercut profits (Galambos 
1997: 145-148).   
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The U.S. federal government began to express concern about the lack of private 
investment in the sector of vaccine R & D.  In 1985, Congress passed the National 
Vaccine Injury Compensation Act (VICP). This act made investment in vaccines more 
profitable for pharmaceutical companies. Previously, pharmaceutical companies could be 
held liable for injuries caused by vaccines. The National Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Act legislates that the federal government will compensate children and parents for 
injuries that result from immunizations on the compensation list (Department of Health 
and Human Services 2006). The act is designed to serve as a catalyst for increased private 
investment in vaccine R & D: “Since its inception, the VICP has been a key component 
in stabilizing the U.S. vaccine market by providing liability protection to both vaccine 
companies and health care providers. Not only does it provide a more streamlined and 
less adversarial alternative to the traditional tort system for resolving claims, the VICP 
encourages research and development of new and safer vaccines” (Division of Vaccine 
Injury Compensation 2006).5   
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 allowed university researchers to patent technologies 
that they discovered while working on government contracts. Previously, university 
researchers were not entitled to property rights concerning the work done in stat-funded 
research projects. Along with the Vaccine Injury Compensation Act, the Bayh-Dole act 
stimulated private sector investment in research and development. The ability to pa ent 
                                                
5 The following vaccines are covered by the VICP: Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis (DTP, DTaP, Tdap, DT, 
Td, or TT); Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib); Hepatitis A (HAV); Hepatitis B (HBV); Human 
papillomavirus (HPV);  Influenza (TIV, LAIV) [given each year during the flu season]; Measles, mumps, 
rubella (MMR, MR, M, R); Meningococcal (MCV4, MPSV4); Polio (OPV or IPV); Pneumococcal 
conjugate (PCV); Rotavirus (RV); Varicella (VZV); Any combination of the vaccines above; Additional 
vaccines may be added in the future (National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program). 
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technology, it is believed, has opened up pathways for the transfer of technology from 
laboratories to pharmaceutical companies to the public.  
Pharmaceutical companies became more interested in vaccine research and 
development after the implementation of these policies. As of 1997, taxpayers cover 36% 
($500 million) of funding in the field of vaccine research and development, large 
pharmaceutical and biotech companies provide 46% ($650 million) and risk capital 
provides 18% ($250 million) (National Vaccine Advisory Committee 1997:3). Now, 
private companies fund almost half of all vaccine R&D, but the retreat of the private 
sector from vaccine development in the previous period left only a few major firms who 
now hold a significant monopoly over the production and distribution of vaccines.  
In the early 1970s Merck’s R & D pipeline for new drugs did not look promising, 
“Merck’s growth had been sustained by a series of new products discovered through 
screening, assays, chemical isolation and chemical synthesis. [B]ut in the early 1970’s the 
pace of innovation was slowing at Merck…” (Galambos 1995: 120-121). Shortly after 
this lull, success with the vaccine for Hepatitis-B positioned Merck as a leader in the new 
cycle of vaccine innovation based on recombinant DNA technology. Capitalizing on this 
success, Merck decided to further invest in its vaccine research infrastructure. In 1993 
Merck hired Katherin Jansen, a yeast expert, whose work was crucial to the development 
of the HPV vaccine that eventually became Gardasil. In 1995 Merck purchased rights to 
use certain patented technologies that were necessary to even begin research on an HPV 
vaccine.  
The path to the doability of Gardasil could have been different. Various scientific, 
social political and economic developments littered the path of Gardasil’s innovation. 
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Had vaccine research remained doable within the state or university apparatus and did not 
need the investment of pharmaceutical companies it is possible that an HPV vaccine 
would have been made available sooner or not at all. In the next section we move to the 
production of biovalue, where public good becomes potential commercial profit. 
 
Producing Biovalue: Public Good becomes Potential Commercial Profit 
 
The most important breakthrough in the development of the HPV vaccine was 
less of a single breakthrough than a process. This process revolved around the production 
of biovalue and the transfer of that (patented) knowledge from the publicly funded 
domain of university research to biotech companies and then to pharmaceutical 
companies. Over the course of four years scientists on opposite sides of the globe figured 
out how to clone only the outer shell of the HPV virus to produce virus-like-particles. 
These virus-like particles (VLPs) can create an immune response that blocks the major 
protein forming the outer layer of the real virus, thus preventing infection. But the VLPs 
do not hold the infectious genetic material contained in the human papillomavirus and 
cannot cause infection. Claiming “discovery” of this crucial HPV virus-like-particle, four 
institutions engaged in a patent battle over property rights to this technology: the 
University of Queensland, Australia, the University of Rochester, the National Institutes 
of Health’s National Cancer Institutes and Georgetown University (McNeil 2006). The 
inventors are microbiologists or virologists and most had been working with human 
papillomaviruses for some time. Between the years of 1991 and 1994 each team made a 
substantial scientific contribution to the development of HPV vaccines.  
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Patents and Interference 
 Ian Frazer, a microbiologist at the University of Queensland at Brisbane 
(Australia), began working with human papillomaviruses in the early 1980s.  Jian Zhou, 
who had also been working with HPV for almost a decade, joined Frazer at the 
University of Queensland in Brisbane in 1989. The team’s research was funded by grants 
from the federal government in Australia (Zhou et. al 1991:256). 6 They realized they had 
a breakthrough when they discovered that two of the proteins on the outer shell of the 
HPV 16 virus would self-assemble into a virus-like-particle when correctly expressed in a 
host (Zhou et. al 1991). They quickly patented this discovery. This biotechnology was 
licensed to Commonwealth Serum Laboratories, Ltd. (CSL) a few months later.  
At Georgetown University in 1992, a year after Frazer and Zhou presented their 
discovery at the 10th International Papilloma Virus conference in Seattle, Ghim, Jenson 
and Schlegel expanded on the discovery. Ghim et. al found that for the VLPs to produce 
effective antibodies, they have to fold correctly (Ghim et. al 1992). Initially, the 
Georgetown University team was awarded the U.S. patent because the VLPs made by 
Zhou and Frazer did not fold correctly. The U.S. Court of Appeals overturned this 
decision in August of 2007. They found that the PCT (Patent Cooperation Treaty) 
                                                
6 The funding agencies include: The National Health and Medical Research Council of 
Australia, the Queensland Cancer fund, the Mayne bequest, and the Princess Alexandra 
Hospital Research and Development Foundation 
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application that Frazer and Zhou had filed in 1991 qualified as an “enabling disclosure” 
in the making of the VLPs (U.S. Court of Appeals 2007).7  
 At the University of Rochester, the team of virologists did not start out looking 
for a prophylactic vaccine. The group was trying to develop a quick and accurate method 
for identifying whether high-risk HPV types are associated with abnormal Pap smear 
results (Ireland 2006).  Robert Rose, a member of the Rochester team, learned at an HIV 
conference how to make virus-like-particles in 1990 (Ireland 2006). Along with his team 
in 1993, Rose et. al produced VLPs that folded correctly and demonstrated that these 
VLPs provoked an antibody response in animals (Rose et. al 1993). This research was 
funded by U.S. federal grants from the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases (NIAD) and the DHHS (ibid). Rose et. al patented this discovery and licensed it 
to a biotechnology company called MedImmune. 
 Also in 1993 Douglas Lowy, John Schiller and Reinhard Kirnbaueer discovered 
that researchers could produce better assembling VLPs by using a different strain of 
HPV-16 from which to clone the major shell protein (Lowy et. al 1993). This group was 
also able to patent this enabling disclosure, although as research scientists working for the 
NIH’s National Cancer Institute the United States Federal Government automatically 
licenses their discovery.  
Biotechnology Companies and Early Phase Trials 
There were two biotechnology companies involved in the production of Gardasil: 
Commonwealth Serum Laboratories (CSL) and MedImmune. Post-patenting, biotech 
                                                
7 The Patent Cooperation Treaty is an international agreement involving 117 countries. 
The agreement respects priority dates for patents submitted in other countries.  
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companies take the role of mediator and serve to transfer valuable scientific knowledge 
from ‘bench to bedside.’ After the crucial VLP technologies were licensed to the biotech 
firms, these firms provided the test vaccine so that university scientists could conduct 
more extensive animal trials (and in some cases preliminary human trials). Only after 
these early trials had provided proof of concept, did Merck and GSK on-license the 
patented technology from CSL and MedImmune respectively. Biotechnology companies 
began sprouting up after the Bayh-Dole Act opened up patent rights to universities and 
the individual scientists at those universities (Zucker and Darby 1996). The ability to 
patent biotechnological products encouraged investment in start-up biotech companies 
that serve to facilitate transfer of innovative technologies to larger pharmaceutical 
companies. 
 Medimmune founded by Wayne T. Hockmeyer in 1988, is based in Gaithersburg, 
Maryland and has approximately 2000 employees worldwide. In 2005, the company 
reported over $1 billion U. S. dollars in annual revenues and investments of more than 
$384 million in research and development (Medimmune Annual Report 2005). CSL is an 
Australian biotech company that began as a state agency in charge of vaccine 
manufacture (Galambos 1995). It was privatized in 1994. According to their annual 
report, CSL received $86 million from Merck & Co. Inc. in royalty payments on global 
sales of Gardasil (CSL Annual Report). 
 Phase I trials for the vaccine that was eventually approved as Gardasil beg n in 
1997. After extensive animal trials, preliminary human trials tested the safety and 
immunogenicity (whether or not the vaccine produces antibodies) of the VLP vaccine 
concept. These trials were conducted under the Investigational New Drug Application 
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submitted by Merck to the Food and Drug Administration’s Vaccines and Related 
Biological Products Committee. Merck completed six phase I and II trialsand two phase 
III trials for Gardasil (VRPBAC 2006).   
 The results of the first trials of the HPV vaccine that was licensed to MedImmune 
and GlaxoSmithKline, were presented at the 18th International Papillomavirus 
Conference in Barcelona, Spain in 2000. The 19th IPV conference, held in Brazil in 2001, 
brought together results from phase one and two trials, as well as results from early phase 
trials conducted by the National Cancer Institute. Although early phase trials had hown 
the safety and immunogenicity of the HPV-VLP vaccine, clinical efficacy data was 
largely missing.  Researchers from the National Cancer Institute (NCI)conducted the 
very first large double blind phase II clinical trial in Costa Rica (Berry and Palefsky 
2003:5). In this study the endpoints were persistence of HPV infection and development 
of cervical lesions.  
 When Medimmune licensed technologies relating to the HPV vaccine from 
Rochester University, the company was convinced that it had obtained exclusive 
licensure for the technology. The company history reads: “October 1995: MedImmune 
acquires exclusive worldwide rights to human papillomavirus technology developed at 
the University of Rochester”  (Medimmune Company History 1995). The ensuing patent
battle resulted in a loss of this exclusivity. The patent rights that come along with vaccine 
R & D and guarantee a market monopoly for the life of the patent. During this monopoly 
period companies make the majority of their profits.  Since 1979, the vaccine industry has 
been aware “that without a high rate of sustained innovation, the vaccine business could 
not be conducted on a profitable basis…” (Galambos 1995: 147).  Without exclusive 
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property rights to enabling disclosures, other companies and/or governments can make 
cheaper generics, cutting into profits.  
In 1993, Merck hired Katherin Jansen, a microbiologist and a yeast expert as the 
Executive Director of Microbial Vaccine Research for Merck Research Laboratories. In 
1995, Merck on-licensed Frazer’s HPV VLP discovery and Jansen began work on the 
HPV vaccine that would soon become Gardasil (Grady 2003). After licensing the 
necessary technologies and hiring Jansen, Merck was able to produce Gardasil. The 
vaccine technologies licensed to GlaxoSmithKline eventually became Cervarix, which 
was released after Merck’s Gardasil had already enjoyed almost a year of complete 
monopoly on the HPV vaccine market.  
The production of biovalue happened in university and state health agency 
settings. That knowledge was transferred through patents and licensing mechanisms to 
the private sector where profit logics reign. The prospect of preventing a deadly human 
disease such as cancer stimulated both a logic of profit and a logic of public good. That 
both of these logics were able to justify the development of an HPV vaccine, following 
the production of biovalue potential, meant that the state (through NCI), Merck and 
biotech companies were involved in these early phase trials. After this period, researchers 
had proved that they had a vaccine that could stimulate anti-bodies against HPV, but 
proving that the vaccine was efficacious in preventing cervical cancer proved 
problematic.  
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An ethopolitics on trial: accelerated approval and phase III trials 
   Before final approval Merck had to prove the efficacy of Gardasil in phase III 
clinical trials. Decisions concerning vaccine indications (the specific disease that a 
medicine prevents or cures) and which HPV types to include needed to be made. These 
decisions highlight the ethopolitics of the development of Gardasil. A committee in h
FDA approval process subsequently evaluates these decisions before releasing the 
vaccine to the public.  
Vaccine indications: cervical cancer, anogenital cancer or HPV 
The target disease of the vaccine was not a forgone conclusion. The vaccine could 
be described as prevention for cervical cancer, making it a women’s health issue; a  
anogenital (genital and anal) cancer prevention; or as protection from the sexually 
transmitted disease HPV. A status report on the development of HPV vaccines made for 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation reports:  
Considerable attention is being paid to how to best position the vaccine (i.e., for cancer 
prevention or for sexually transmitted infection [STI] prevention). There is concern that 
in some settings, presenting the vaccine as an STI-prevention measure could have a 
negative impact on acceptance rates. However, other experts posit that ensuring that 
women (or the parents of minors) fully understand all implications of the intervention 
is a fundamental right and not providing complete information would be unethical. The 
tension between these two positions makes this issue particularly sensitive. The two 
vaccine companies differ in their positioning on this issue. GSK will promote its 
vaccine as one to prevent cervical cancer by reducing susceptibility to the STI that 
causes it. Merck will position its vaccine to protect against both cancer d genital 
warts (PATH 2005).   
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For pharmaceutical companies, the ‘tension’ referred to in the above quote is of the 
utmost importance. A lack of immediate vaccine acceptance would put the profitability of 
their patent monopoly in jeopardy and thereby most of the profitability of Gardasil more 
generally. Merck has marketed Gardasil exclusively as a vaccine for c rvical cancer. This 
decision shows how profit motives shaped innovation. 
As the science progressed from microbiology to other disciplines, preventing 
“anogenital cancers” mysteriously shifted to preventing “cervical cancer”. The reasoning 
behind this move is less clear than that of an underlying logic of profit, but a clue lies in
the methods used to test the efficacy of the vaccine. Young women, a category denoting 
“females 16 to 23 years of age” were randomly assigned to either a placebo group or a 
vaccine group in a classic double-blind study design (Koutsky et al. 2002:1645).8 Genital 
samples were obtained from participants to assess their HPV status upon enrollment in 
the trial and multiple times thereafter. This reasoning was used to exclude men fro  
clinical trials in the VRBPAC meeting. FDA consultant Dr. Karen Goldenthal comments, 
“Now, in women, the cervix is the sample that is most commonly used, and that is the site 
where the pathology is. And the appropriate sample in males is not at all clear”  
(VRBPAC 2006).  
The female body has long been a site for medical intervention, especially when 
reproductive organs are concerned (Oudshoorn 2003). The inability of researchers to 
devise a way to test men for HPV and its related diseases reifies the femal body as an 
object to be intervened upon. Men do not get cervical cancer, but zur Hausen’s discovery 
did not include only cervical cancer but anal and penile cancers were also associated with 
                                                
8 In a double-blind study neither the clinicians nor the ‘subjects’ know who received a 
placebo and who received the vaccine. 
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the same high-risk HPV types. This points to the power of women’s health advocacy in 
the United States as an issue that compels actions based on a broad moral imperative to 
promote and protect women’s health. In this case, the promotion of women’s health is to 
the exclusion and even the intentional elision of the possibility of promoting and 
protecting men’s health. The assumption of heteronormativity also does this work of 
effacing men’s risk by ignoring the health needs of homosexual men who have higher 
rates of anogenital cancer. 
The search for Clinical Endpoints: Making “good” profit possible 
 Clinical endpoints are the necessarily well-specified goals of phase III clinical 
trials. For example, the best (theoretical) endpoint for a vaccine to prevent cervical cancer 
would be invasive cervical cancer. If researchers did not see a significant drop in cervical 
cancer (the endpoint) after administration of a vaccine, then the FDA would not approve 
the product. This search for clinical endpoints was also a search for the scientific 
justification for Merck’s decision to market the vaccine as cervical cancer prevention. 
The development of clinical endpoints for phase III efficacy trials proved problematic 
and  logic of profit again delayed the progress of Gardasil. 
 The human papillomavirus is a necessary cause of cervical cancer but not a 
sufficient cause. Microbiologists largely agree that HPV must be present for cervical 
cancer to develop but ninety percent of cases of HPV infection clear the body without 
intervention. What science has yet to discover are the conditions under which HPV does 
in fact progress to cancer. Although HPV can cause cervical cancer, there is another 
mechanism that enables HPV to become cancer.  The success of Pap smear screening is 
based on identification of lesions caused by HPV infection, followed by evaluation of the 
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persistence and type of lesion and (possibly) their subsequent removal (Clarke and 
Casper 1998). Despite the conceptual consensus, questions and uncertainties concerning 
the link between HPV and cancer remain.  
The time lag between HPV infection and the development of cervical cancer is 
disputed. Most women are not considered at risk for cervical cancer until 15 to 20 years 
after infection with HPV. A major stumbling block in the development of Gardasil was 
the lack of clear clinical endpoints with which to analyze the efficacy of a vaccine 
(Pagliusi 2004). Obvious ethical considerations preclude using cervical cancer itself as a 
clinical endpoint, especially because early detection through cytological screening is a 
successful, pre-existing method. Finding the appropriate clinical endpoints is a necessary 
step for beginning the all-important Phase III trials that are designed to test the efficacy 
of a product as concerns its “official” indications.  
Clinical trials are about statistics and Merck needed a null hypothesis. To conduct 
efficacy trials, researchers had to be able to falsify the inefficacy of the vaccine.  In other 
words, they needed to know how many cases of cervical neosplasia9 would “naturally” 
occur in the population in order to determine if the vaccine had prevented a significant 
amount of those natural occurrences. To establish clear clinical endpoints, vaccine 
developers needed to understand the “natural history” of the human papillomavirus. In 
the mid-1990s Katherin Jansen met Laura Koutsky, an epidemiologist from the 
University of Washington at Seattle.10 Koutsky had been studying the natural history of 
                                                
9 A precancerous lesion on the cervix 
10 Where and how these two met would tell an important story about how Merck was able 
to gain access to Koutsky’s valuable knowledge, but I have found conflicting stories of 
their meeting, although the time frame of 1994-1995 has been consistent. 
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the human papillomavirus since the late 1980s (Bock 2007). Koutsky’s epidemiological 
work was the key to moving into the crucial phase III trials.  
Koutsky’s role in the development of Gardasil is undeniable; it earned her first 
authorship on the proof-of-concept trial publications (Koutsky 2002). Koutsky’s natural 
history data solved the problem of the uncertainties concerning the time lag between 
HPV and cervical cancer. Nine hundred female volunteers on the University of 
Washington campus participated in Koutsky’s research starting in the late-1980s.  For 
three years, the women were followed up with pelvic exams and detailed questionnaires 
about their sex lives. These data provided evidence of the temporal relationship between 
HPV types-16 and -18 and the high-grade lesions of the cervix that are the precursors of 
invasive cervical cancer.  Koutsky found that it takes only months to go from infectio  
with HPV to the development of pre-cancerous legions (Koutsky 1992). In 2001 at the 
19th Papillomavirus Conference in Brazil, Laura Koutsky presented preliminary efficacy 
results based on her earlier epidemiological findings. 
 In November of 2001, the Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory 
Committee (VRBPAC : a branch of the FDA) held an open session to discuss the 
possible surrogate endpoints for the accelerated approval of Gardasil. For two days, a 
committee made up of scientists and researchers from various disciplines listened to 
presenters and discussed the appropriate clinical endpoints for the Gardasil trials. By the 
end of the session, the committee had come to a consensus. Cervical cancer could not be 
used as an endpoint, so the committee decided that the clinical endpoints would be 
cervical intraepithelial neosplasia (CIN) grades 2/3, and CIN 3. These endpoints line up 
with the standard of care in Pap smear screening. When clinicians identify CIN 2/3 or 
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CIN3, women are immediately followed up with biopsy of the lesions. This decision 
standardized the identification of abnormal pap smear results that have been locally 
controlled and manipulated since the advent of cytological screening (see Casperand 
Clarke 1998).  
 
HPV types, cervical cancer, and the distribution of risk  
 The first proof of concept study showed that Gardasil was 100 percent effective in 
preventing CIN2/3 and CIN3 (Koutsky et al. 2002). These results were astonishing; most 
vaccines have a success rate between 70 and 90 percent. The next decision concerned 
which types of HPV should be included in the vaccine. HPV type 16 was the original 
carcinogenic type of HPV discovered by zur Hausen and confirmed by Durst. But 
subsequently, over 40 “high-risk” strains of HPV have been identified. Choosing which 
types to include in the vaccine was a decision to be made by Merck. HPV types 16 and 
18 are the most prevalent causes of cases of cervical cancer, and preventing infection 
from these types would theoretically prevent 71 percent of cases worldwide. But the 
geographical distribution of HPV types is varied. HPV 16 and 18 have the highest 
prevalence in Europe and North America, while non-vaccine types 45 and 31 have been 
shown to cause significant amounts of disease in Africa and Latin America (Munoz et al. 
2004). 
 Global rates of cervical cancer were quoted by Merck to justify the public good of 
their vaccine during the final presentation to the FDA for the approval of Gardasil. 
Missing from the presentation was an analysis of the global geographical distribution of 
this risk. A logic of public good would justify saving the maximum amount of lives, but 
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profit requires users that can afford Gardasil.11 The population that can afford Gardasil is 
not the population that has the greatest need for a vaccine against cervical cancer. The 
population that has the greatest need and therefore justifies a logic of good is not 
compatible with a logic of profit. This logic of profit is written into the innovation itself. 
In addition, due to the patenting of “enabling disclosures” it is unlikely that another 
vaccine with different types will become available in the near future.12 This demonstrates 
how a logic of profit is indistinguishable from a logic of public good depending on the 
reference category of that good. If we interrogate that reference category, we see that a 
logic of profit had the upper hand in the final outcome.  
The declines in the rates of cervical cancer in the United States have not received 
much attention in this process. Since the 1950’s cervical cancer rates have been 
decreasing due to increased Pap smear use. This reduction in disease burden follows 
patterns of stratification common to other diseases and cancers. Poor women and women 
of color suffer a disproportionate number of what cases still occur of treatable nd 
preventable diseases (Shi and Stevens 2004). Middle class women in the United States 
get regular pap smears and thus, are able to intercept and get rid of any HPV related 
disease that might lead to cervical cancer. Women in the United States have a 0.9 percent 
chance of developing cervical cancer and a 0.3 percent chance of death from cervical
cancer (VRBPAC 2001:69). These rates are higher for low-income women, and African 
                                                
11 “National vaccine markets are usually two-tiered: with a large public sector and a smaller private sector 
in which prices and margins were higher. Only in the United States was the private portion of the market 
large enough to enable a producer to make profits that would justify continued investment in vaccines over 
the long run” (Galambos 1995: 208). 
12 It is worthwhile to note that Cervarix, the vaccine being developed by GlaxoSmithKline does protect 
against HPV types 16, 18, 45, and 31 but epidemiolog sts suggest a vaccine that could protect against the 
seven most prevalent high-risk types would be the best-case scenario (Munoz et al. 2004). 
   
   
 39
American women. Recent Asian immigrant women have the highest rates of cervical 
cancer in the United States (ibid).  
In an open meeting of the Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory 
Committee Cindy Pearson, a representative from the Women’s Health Network, 
addressed this very issue.  
So even though overall we look at cases of cancer and likelihood of death from 
cervical cancer that are very small in, and you might say low on the priority list for 
women in the U.S.  But as a broad-based consumer group, we are aware that for 
certain groups of women in the United States that it is much higher on the priority 
list (VRBPAC 2001: 109). 
 
 The complexities and tensions between public good, commercial profit and how 
public good is defined are revealed in Pearson’s statements. This use of the at-risk 
situation of poor and minority populations in the United States extracts the potential of 
public good from these women’s at-risk bodies and instrumentalizes that corporeal risk as 
a justification for a vaccine that may not be made practically available or useful to these 
specific groups for decades. This type of argument wields immense power in a 
contemporary political formation of identity politics where inequality is rhetorically 
condemned but tolerated in practice.  
Pearson continues, “But I would still put forth the perspective from our consumer 
group that a vaccine that is either approved preliminarily through accelerated approval, or 
finally through final approval based on its ability to prevent either infinite infection or 
persistent infection, isn’t really making that much of a difference in women’s lives” 
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(VRBPAC 2001: 109).  This quote, juxtaposed to her last comment reveals an 
intersectional tension within the category of woman. The “broad based consumer group” 
of her first comment includes those “certain groups of women in the United States” th t 
are at substantial risk for cervical cancer and thus justify the need for the vaccine. In the 
second comment, the approval of the vaccine is not an urgent need based on the at-risk 
status of these groups, but becomes inconsequential as it concerns for “women’s lives”. 
Preventing cervical cancer is preventing a women’s cancer, but cervical cancer is not 
simply a women’s cancer; it does not affect all women with equal opportunity.  
Choosing the indication of cervical cancer, as opposed to preventing infection 
from HPV, was an ethopolitical move designed to harness this logic of public good 
(defined as preventing a women’s cancer), push the approval process and guarantee 
vaccine acceptance to the end of commercial profit. Due to intense AIDS activism, he 
clinical trial process had been reshaped since the early 1990s to push drugs through the 
FDA system as quick as possible (see Epstein’s work on Impure Science). This 
accelerated approval process was available to Merck. 
Accelerated Approval 
The Food and Drug Administration’s accelerated approval process was 
formalized under the FDA Modernization Act of 1997. Accelerated approval is “intended 
to provide expedited marketing of drugs for patients suffering from such illnesses when 
the drugs provide meaningful therapeutic benefit compared to existing treatment” (FDA 
1992: 58942).  The FDA will consider accelerated approval if appropriate surrogate 
clinical endpoints can “reasonably suggest” the drug’s effect on the real clinical 
endpoints (ibid). The accelerated approval process was the FDA response to pressureof 
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civil society organizations that were pushing for quicker and freer access to xperimental 
therapies for HIV/AIDS and cancer and most of the drugs approved under this process 
had those diseases as their target (Roberts and Chabner 2004).   
Gardasil is the first prophylactic vaccine to be approved under the guidelines of 
this accelerated approval process. The Biological License Application for Gardasil 
(submitted to the FDA after phase III trials) received priority review status. Priority 
review status reduces the time frame in which the FDA reviews and approves a new drug 
from ten months to only six months. It is clear from these two actions that the FDA was 
convinced that preventing cervical cancer with Gardasil represented a meaningful benefit 
as compared to existing therapies and needed to be released to women as soon as 
possible. This is a logic of public good that justifies the quick approval of Gardasil. 
Reiterating this point, FDA consultant Dr. Karen Goldenthal warns, “The original and 
current purpose of accelerated approval is to serve the best interests of the public and I 
did want to note that presented vaccines have not been previously approved using 
accelerated approval regulations (VRBPAC 2001:85; emphasis added). At the same time, 
accelerated approval follows a logic of profit. The patent monopolies that are crucial to 
the profitability of vaccines only last for 14 years and Merck knew that GSK was 
following closely behind Gardasil with another HPV vaccine, Cervarix.  
Gardasil was approved on June 6, 2006 with a unanimous decision from the 
VRBPAC committee. As one of the final indications, Gardasil was proven to prevent 
cervical cancer. 
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Discussion 
The potential for public good represented by the discovery of the etiological role 
of HPV in cervical cancer was not enough to spur pharmaceutical interest in 1984. 
Though rates of cervical had been steadily decreasing in Western countries, less 
developed nations still had high rates of cervical cancer deaths. Commercial profit 
potential was not recognized in zur Hausen’s discovery in the eighties, and 
pharmaceutical companies were simply not interested in creating a vaccine for cervical 
cancer despite high death rates in developing countries. Whether or nor zur Hausen 
himself was motivated by profit or pubic good, by providing a necessary cause, the path 
to prevention was opened. Despite this opening of potential for public good in 1984, 
Gardasil did not become available for another 22 years. The lack of potential commercial 
profit delayed the emergence of this technology. At this moment in the development of 
Gardasil public good and commercial profit were easily distinguishable (see figure 3). 
Without pharmaceutical buy-in an HPV vaccine could not be brought to market and the 
potential for profit (a prerequisite for pharmaceutical buy-in) was not yet apparent. 
 The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 made it possible for university scientists to patent 
technologies discovered while working under government contracts. The Vaccine 
Compensation Act spurred increased interest in these patentable technologies and th ir 
potential use in commercial vaccine development. Funding for the university scientists 
often comes largely from federal health research grants. This research money, which is 
doled out based on public health service research, becomes connected to the forces of 
commercial profit through this patenting of enabling disclosures. Patents and lice sing 
enable the transfer of knowledge to the end of individual profit and public good. At this 
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moment during the development of Gardasil, the production of biovalue, the logic of 
profit is indistinguishable from the logic of public good. The logic of profit is subsumed 
under the more salient rubric of public good and the two logics are apparently compatible 
(see figure 4).  
 Discovering HPV VLPs was the biomedical breakthrough that signaled to 
pharmaceutical companies the potential for a profitable deployment of biovalue. To 
instrumentalize that potential Merck first had to on-license the necessarily patented 
technology needed to work on a vaccine. Next, they had to find the necessary expertise, 
which was outside the field of microbiology and in the discipline of epidemiology.  
Hailed by some as one of the most significant medical breakthroughs, Gardasil 
proved 100 percent effective and an ethics committee stopped the trials in order to 
administer the vaccine to the placebo participants. Gardasil was seen by some as the 
perfect example of how public good and commercial profit can, should, and do 
successfully work together. A closer look at the notion of public good, however, reveals 
the tensions that reside within. The public, we discover, is not an all-encompassing notio  
that refuses to distinguish between populations. The logic of public good is revealed in 
the last instance as multiple and contingent on who is defining ‘public’ (see figur5). 
 
Conclusion 
New biomedical possibilities in conjunction with neo-liberal policies designd to 
increase the potential for commercial profit (and thereby provide for the public good) 
provided the avenues through which Gardasil was made possible. The transfer of 
valuable scientific knowledge within a neo-liberal political economy allows potential 
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biovalue to become attached to logics of profit. The sheer cost of equipment and 
materials in addition to patent laws that create monopolies on scientific knowledge, 
dramatically increase the costs associated with moving a potential vaccine even beyond 
animal trials. Patent laws also impede competition from rival companies by granting 
monopoly rights to patent holders of new vaccines. Policies designed to stimulate 
pharmaceutical interest in vaccine development encourage companies to watch and wait 
for suitable patents with which to engineer a product with a built-in insurance poliy. 
In biomedical innovation the politics of scientific knowledge are ethopolitical. 
The ethopolitical argument that insists preventing cervical cancer with a vaccine is an 
undeniable public good, needs the risky bodies of those groups whose lack of access to 
pap smears puts them at risk of cervical cancer. Without these at-risk bodies there the 
need for Gardasil is questionable. These bodies support the ethically grounded political
argument that we should support the uneasy marriage between science, government, and 
industry because it resolves the tension between public good and private profit. But these 
bodies are not those that will make Gardasil profitable 
The development of Gardasil depended on both logics of commercial profit and 
logics of public good. Though Gardasil emerged with the appearance of satisfying both, 
the definition of public good varied by actor and institution. Varying notions of who 
constitutes this public reveal the continuing tension between good and profit in the final 
vaccine. Gardasil appears to collapse the logics of good and profit. Merck’s focus on 
young girls supports this conceptual collapse by eliding the reality that only for specific 
publics does HPV even get the chance to progress to cervical cancer.  
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The question of good versus profit in this inquiry gets to the heart of a 
neoliberalism that encourages privatization in the name of public good. Although these 
profit logics were constrained by the need for an ethical biomedicine, in the ed logics of 
profit had the upper hand. Our shared fear of cancer as the disease that science cannot 
beat provides Gardasil with an almost ready-made market for its medical benefits. This 
market though, does not include those women whose risk for cervical cancer supported 
arguments in favor of the vaccine’s development. Both inside and outside of the United 
States, these women are least likely to have access to Gardasil.  
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Figure 1 Social Worlds/Arenas Map 
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Figure 3 
Positional Map: Doability 
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Figure 5 Positional Map: On Trial 
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